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COMMENT
Can Bambi Ride Herd over
Godzilla?' The Role of Executive
Oversight in EPA's Rulemaking for

the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination
endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take
nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry
can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and
military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and
goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.2
INTRODUCTION
On July 16, 1945, the United States exploded the first atomic
bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico.? The test marked the success of the
highly secret Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico.4 Since 1943,
scientists had worked at a feverish pace to give the United States a
national defense against a presumed German nuclear threat.5 After
World War II American knowledge that the Germans were far from
actually developing an atom bomb did not slow efforts by the American

1. 125 CONG. REc. H6298, 6310 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) ("[Alsking EPA to oversee DOE
is like asking Bambi to ride herd over Godzilla. To date, EPA has been unable to hold DOE.
accountable for even the most blatant violations of environmental laws. So we really believe
that it will be able to keep DOE in line on this projectr)(statement of Rep. Wolpe). See also
BAMBI MEETs GODZIuA (Pyramid Film and Video 1969).
2. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the
American People, January 17,1961, reprintedin Pus. PAPERS OF THE PRsM M.: DWIGtiT D.
EISENHOWER 1960-1961, 1365, 1368 (1961).
3. GREGG HRKc, COuNsms OF WAR 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (Alfred A. Knopf
1985).
4. PErR PRINGLE & JAMES SPIGELm.AN, THE NUCLEAR BARONS 30-32 (1981).
5. Nuclear scientists, fearing that Nazi Germany would develop and use a nuclear
weapon against allied forces, recommended to President Roosevelt that the United States
develop its own atomic bomb. RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 303,
312-17 (1986).
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government to develop nuclear weapons.' The United States continued
to develop and build nuclear weapons despite its knowledge that no
other power had developed nuclear weapons capabilities7 Later the
policy of nuclear weapons development continued during times of peace.
The policy was based upon a national security theory that the United
States nuclear weapons arsenal would deter other nuclear nations from
launching a nuclear attack against the United States.8
The end result of a 50 year policy of nuclear weapons deterrence,
however, is a military-industrial complex of staggering proportions. The
Brookings Institute 0 estimates that the United States has spent $4 trillion
on "most, but by no means all of the direct, indirect and overhead costs
required to develop, produce, deploy, operate, support and control
dedicated U.S. nuclear forces over the last 50 years."" Despite the end
of United States nuclear weapons production, approximately 25
nuclear weapons facilities continue to employ an estimated 135,500
people. 3 In 1995 alone, the price tag for nuclear weapons and weaponsrelated activities was at least $25 billion.'
The byproduct of nuclear deterrence is nuclear waste. Today
huge quantities of radioactive waste have accumulated and are contaminating nuclear weapons facilities located throughout the country. 5 The
pollution from poorly stored waste may be irreparable. 16 Indeed, Dan

6. HERwiN, see generally supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 9-10.
9. BROOKINGS INTsirr,

ACTIVE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION FACI rES 1-14 (Stephen L Schwartz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
BROOJUNGS].
10. The Brookings Institute is a non-profit organization devoted to public service

through research and education in social sciences particularly in economics, government and
foreign policy. The Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. U 300 (15th ed. 1983).
II. BROOICNGS INsTruE, ATOMIC AUDr

WHAT THE US. NUCLEAR ARSENAL REALLY

COST: A PREuMINARY REPORT By THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COST STUDY PROJECT 1
(Stephen L.Schwartz ed., 1995) [hereinafter ATOMIC AUDIT).
12. "All of the major facilities in the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex were
shut down in the late 1980s. For several reasons, the end of production was quite sudden
and largely unexpected." OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, CLOSING THE CIRCLE ON THE SPLITING OF THE ATOM: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY

OF NUCLEAR WEAONS PRODUCTION INTHE UNITED STATES AND WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY IsDOING ABOUT IT 79 (1995).
13. Schwartz, BROOKcINGS, supra note 9.
14. Schwartz, ATOMIC AUDIT, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENVIONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
INTEGRATED DATA BASE REPORT-1993: U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND RADIOACIVE WASTE

INvENT Rems, IROJECnoNS, AND CHARACTERISTICS (1994) [hereinafter IDB] (DOE/RW-0006,
Rev. 10).
16. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX CLEANUP THE
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Reicher, former counsel for the Natural Resources Defense Council,
believes that the prohibitive cost of cleanup would force the government to
declare some sites to be "national sacrifice zones."1 7 The problem of
nuclear waste is made more acute because radioactive wastes from nuclear
weapons production can be very dangerous and very long-lived."
After over a decade of inattention to the waste problems from
nuclear weapons production, the federal government finally began to
address the dangers posed by radioactive waste. The National Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) in 1955 requested that the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) examine the issue of permanent disposal of radioactive
waste. 19 By 1957, after studying the issue, NAS concluded that "[d]isposal in salt is the most promising method [of disposal of high-level liquid
waste] for the near future. " "
Implementation of the NAS report, however, proved difficult.,
The Department of Energy (DOE)' took 24 years to formulate and
propose a specific site for underground burial of nuclear waste.' In
1979,4 however, DOE finally requested and received congressional
approval to begin construction of a permanent waste disposal site. DOE
selected the salt beds of the Permian Basin located in southeastern New

ENVIRONMMTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION 6 (1991) [hereinafter COMPLEx

CLEANUP).
17. Dick Russell, In the Shadow of the Bomb, 12 THE AMICUS JOURNAL 18 (1990).
18. ARJUN MAMANI & Scorr SALEsKA, INSTITUrE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RESEARCH, IIGH-LEV DOUARS, Low-LEM SENSE: A CRTQUE OF PRESENT POuCY OR THE
MANAGEMENT OF LONG-LIVED WASTES AND DISCUSSION OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 17-19

(1992).
19. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HIGH-LEvEL AND TRANSURANic RADIOACTIVE

WASTES: BACKGROUND INIORMATION DOCUMENT FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1-2 (1993)
[hereinafter EPA) (EPA 402-R-93-07).
20. HARRY H. HESS ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WASTE DSOSAL OF THE
DIVISION OF EARTH SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND 6 (1970).
21. EPA, supra note 19, at 1-2 through 1-7.
22. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) began the investigation. AEC's eventual
successor, DOE, continued the process.
23. In that period of time, DOE generalized the NAS report to include not just liquid
high-level wastes, but also transuranic waste, See supra note 18.
24. Congress was aware of the growing awareness among states about the increasing
public concern over health and safety of nuclear waste. In 1979, the California Superior
Court considered the validity of the California legislatues attempt to forbid the licensing
of any new nuclear power plants until a permanent waste solution was secured, See Pacific
Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.Ca.
1979). The law was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1983. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v.State
Energy Resources Conservationand De'. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See also DEPARmIENT OF
ENERGY, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, WASTE ISOLATION PILOT

PLANT (January 1990) [hereinafter 1990 FEIS) (DOE/ES-0026-FS).
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called the proposed
Mexico about 30 miles east of Carlsbad," and
21
(WIPP).
Plant
Pilot
Isolation
Waste
the
facility
The original purpose of WIPP was to demonstrate that the
underground burial of nuclear waste would offer a permanent solution
to above-ground contamination. To carry out its congressional mandate,
DOE designed and built WIPP between 1979 and 1991. v However, the
WIPP site remained under Department of Interior authority until 1992,
when Congress passed the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (the WIPP
Act).' The Act dedicated the site to the single purpose of nuclear
weapons waste disposal by authorizing the permanent withdrawal from
public use 10,240 acres of southeastern New Mexico land. DOE's mandate
was to demonstrate the feasibility of burying nuclear waste underground
as a permanent disposal solution.'
Despite 35 years of activity, little verification existed in 1992 for
the 1957 NAS hypothesis that underground burial in salt was the most
promising disposal method." Recognizing this, Congress placed
conditions on its authorization to transport radioactive waste to WIPP.
Before WIPP could open, Congress required DOE to demonstrate through
a probabalistic risk assessment process the likelihood that WIPP would
isolate nuclear waste from the accessible environment for 10,000 years. In
addition, before DOE could bring nuclear waste to WIPP for underground experiments, EPA would have to approve the validity of DOE's
test3' and retrievalm plans.
Moreover, congressional concern over DOE's dismal record in
nuclear safety' prompted the designation of the Environmental Protec25. Dep't of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy
Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96464, § 213, 93 Stat. 1259, 1265 (1979).
26. Id.
27. See 41 Fed. Reg. 54,994-95 (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (1978); 45 Fed. Reg. 75,768-69

(1980); 48 Fed. Reg. 3878-79 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 31,038-39 (1983); 54 Fed. Reg. 15,814-15
(1989).
28. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat.

4777-96 (1992).
29. Id.
30. Even today the issue of whether geological burial is a safe, reliable, and permanent
solution remains highly controversial. See, e.g., KS. SHRADER-FRECHETrE, BURYING
AL OF NUCLEAR WASTE
UNCERTAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE AGAINST GEOLOGICAL DI
(1993).
31. Pub. L. No. 102-579 § 5(d)(2)(A), 106 Stat at 4782 (1992) ("[I1f the Administrator
determines that the experiments will provide data that are directly relevant to a certification
of compliance with the final disposal regulations....-).
32. Id. ([I]f the Administrator determines that it [the retrieval plan] will provide for
satisfactory retrieval of all transuranic waste emplaced during the test phase ...
33. See generally DANA COYLE ET AL, DEADLY DEFENSE. MILITARY RADIOACTIVE

LANDFILLS (1988); see COMPLEX CLEANUP supra note 16; see also OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RETRATION AND WASTE MANAG4ENT, DEPARTMENr OF ENERGY, FINAL SUPPLEMENT ENVI-
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tion Agency (EPA) as an independent body responsible for evaluating
and certifying DOE's probable risk assessment as reported in its
compliance certification application.' Furthermore, Congress included
language in the WIPP Act which directed EPA to develop nuclear waste
standards and objective criteria for applying the standards to WIPP in
order to promote accountability and certainty in the regulatory review.W
EPA developed standards36 and criteria pursuant to the WIPP
Act. Unfortunately, the criteria appear to be invalid. EPA's rulemaking
process failed in at least three respects. First EPA did not preserve an
independent regulatory stance pursuant to the WIPP Act. Second, EPA
neglected to provide adequate public notice and comment pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Third, EPA failed to implement
congressionally legislated policy pursuant to the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers.
EPA's process was deficient because executive branch policy
thwarted congressional intent at two levels. First, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulatory review interfered with EPA's
rulemaking autonomy. OMB's mandate to resolve differences between
executive agency decisions prior to publication of a rulemaking enabled
DOE to pressure EPA into changing the compliance criteria after the
public review process had ended. Second, EPA's own lack of statutory
and fiscal autonomy contributed to its inability to conduct an independent review. Presidential oversight and control of EPA's budget,
regulatory policies, and leadership, places the agency under direct
presidential control. This dynamic precludes the autonomy which is
necessary to ensure effective regulation of a cabinet level department.
The WIPP project demonstrates that unless some basic executive
branch organizational changes occur, present administrative infrastructure
will frustrate effective regulation of future WIPP decisions and perhaps
other future military nuclear waste disposal facilities.
A solution to this problem exists. Congress could redress EPA's
lack of regulatory accountability by creating an independent regulatory
agency which parallels NRC. The mandate of the new agency would be
[hereinafter 1990
FEINJ (DOE/EIS-M2&FS). DOE nuclear weapons production, unlike nuclear waste disposal,
is classified under the Atomic Energy Act. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42 U.S.C. 21212122 (1994).
34. 125 CONG. RMc. H6298, 6303 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) (statement of Rep. Synar).
35. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat. at 4786-87 (1992).
36. Original EPA standards were vacated by the 1st Cir. in 1987. See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987). EPA published final standards
in 1993. See Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, 58 Fed.
Reg. 66,398-416 (1993) (40 C.F.R. § 191.15).
RONMwNTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, WASTE ISOLATION PILOr PLANT (Jan. 1990)
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to regulate environmental safety in military nuclear disposal operations.
Congress could safeguard the integrity of such an agency through
statutorily prescribed guarantees of independence from presidential
controlv
BACKGROUND
WIPP is a pioneer in the field of permanent nuclear waste
disposal. The development of the WIPP site has been complicated by the
fact that the program lacks an overall blueprint. Earlier studies for
general mining techniques, nuclear production, and storage of radioactive
and hazardous waste do provide guidance for WIPPs design and
operational procedures?$ However, without proven technologies which
directly relate to permanent nuclear waste disposal, questions remain
about whether the facility can successfully isolate waste for 10,000 years.
Understandably, progress on WIPP is marked by compromise
among competing legal, scientific and political ideas. Conflicting goals of
quick certification, protection of health and safety, economic efficiency,
and scientific accountability struggled for supremacy in the debate which
preceded the 1992 WIPP Act. Not surprisingly, the final version of the
WIPP Act became a compromise among these conflicting interests,
making implementation of the Act an equally controversial matter."
Legal requirementsfor WIPP
Early in WIPP's history, controversy' over the plan to include
both commercial and military nuclear waste in the facility authorized by

37. This paper does not deal with the obstacles posed by congressional budgetary
constraints which could undercut proposals for an independent regulatory agency.
38. See generally PRELIMINARY COMPARISON WITH 40 CFR 191 SUBPART B FOR THE WASTE
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (1991) [hereinafter SANDIA PA) (SAND91-0893/.UC-721),
39. See Pub. L.No. 102-579,106 Stat. 4777-96 (1992).
40. Citizens and officials in New Mexico opposed congressional- approval of WIPP's
construction without some state control over the project. See Waste Isolation Pilot Plant:
Hearingon [House or Senate Bill No.] Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1979)
[hereinafter Procurement Hearing]. To satisfy New Mexico concerns, Congress authorized
DOE to enter into a written agreement with New Mexico to set forth procedures for the
State to consult and cooperate with DOE over "public health and safety aspects of such
project [WIPP] before the occurrence of certain key events identified in the agreement" 93
Stat. at 1266.
However, in 1981 New Mexico Attorney General Jeff Bingaman, dissatisfied with DOE's
initial offers for negotiation procedures, sued DOE and the United States Department of
Interior. Civil Action No. 81-0363 JB (D.N.M. 1981). Eventually New Mexico Governor Bruce
King signed the federal court ordered Stipulated Agreement which approved the Consultation
and Cooperation Agreement. Id. (The Court Order contains the final Consultation and
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Congress almost defeated WIPP.'1 Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),
DOE had exclusive regulatory authority over its nuclear weapons
operations.42 In contrast, civilian nuclear activities took place under the
independent regulatory eye of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).0 NRC regulations require all commercial nuclear waste facilities
to obtain an NRC license before construction." Presumably if WIPP
were a site that contained commercial waste, NRC would play a
regulatory role. Members of the House Armed Services Committee balked
at giving a non-military agency control over any military operation and
threatened to cut off funds." In response to this threat, supporters of the
project agreed to restrict WIPP to military waste."
NRC oversight, then, was avoided by restricting the scope of
WIPP's role. WIPP would be an unlicensed, research and development
facility which would contain only defense transuranic (TRU) wastes and
the byproducts from some limited high-level radioactive waste experiments.4 7 Thus the "DOE National Security and Military Applications of

Cooperation agreement.) This agreement, along with later amendments, guaranteed New
Mexico an advisory role in such key areas as health and safety, transportation, and assured
the State that WIPP would comply with federal and state laws. Stipulated Agreement and
Consultation and Cooperation Agreement (uly 1, 1981) [hereinafter C and C Agreement)
appendix (agrees to timely and open exchange of information about WIPP-creates a
mechanism for conflict resolution on matters "... . relating to the public health, safety or
welfare of the citizens of the State"); See Supplemental Stipulated Agreement Resolving Certain
State Off-Site Concerns over WIPP (Dec. 28, 1982) (commits DOE to seeking congressional
appropriation for upgrading selected WIPP routes in New Mexico-clarifies that DOE is liable
for WIPP-related accidents at or en route to the site); "First Modification" of the C and C
Agreement (Nov. 1984) (requires DOE to comply with "... . all applicable state, federal and
local standards, regulations and laws, including any applicable regulations or standards
promulgated by EPA); Second Modification" of the C and C Agreement (Aug. 1987) (requires
DOE to comply ".... with all applicable regulations of the United States Department of
Transportation and any applicable corresponding regulations of the NRC); Separate
Agreement which amends the 1982 Supplemental Stipulated Agreement (Aug. 1987) (relating
to funding for WIPP relief routes and bypasses in New Mexico).
41. See ProcurementHearing,supra note 40, at 41.
42. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2010, 2011, 2014, 2273, 2282 (1994).
43. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 1501 (1994).
44. Section 202(3) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 stipulates that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission shall have licensing and related regulatory authority as to facilities
used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes. Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 1244 (1974).
45. Procurement Hearing,supra note 40 (statement of Rep. Dan Daniel).
46. Id.
47. Transuranic (TRU) waste literally means heavier than uranium. Transuranics are
man-made elements in that they are byproducts of fission and fusion reactions in nuclear
reactors and nuclear testing. MAXHIJANI, supra note 18, at 17-19. Plutonium 239, the main
transuranic component of defense radioactive wastes, has a half-life of 24,000 years. In
practical terms, this half-life means that Plutonium remains radioactive for over 240,000
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Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980" authorized WIPP "for the
express purpose of providing a research and development facility to
demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from
defense activities and programs of the United States exempted from
regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
WIPP was the first DOE nuclear weapons site to be authorized
and constructed in over 25 years.' During that period of time, Congress
changed the legal background against which such sites could be
constructed. Congressional enactment of several general laws provided
a structure for regulating environmental pollution and degradation.'
Until WIPP, DOE's nuclear activities had been clothed in the
secret privilege of the Atomic Energy Act.' WIPP was different.
Congress expedited WIPP for national security reasons.' The facility,
however, was not a classified operation. Although Congress authorized
WIPP's construction without an NRC license, Congress did not expressly
exempt WIPP from environmental laws either in WIPP's mandate' or
in those laws
Therefore, DOE would have to comply with federal environmental
laws if the facility were ever to accept nuclear waste.' Essentially, the
WIPP certification process resulted in a clash between established national
security practices, which excluded public access to nuclear activities, and
environmental legislation, which expressly invited public involvement.

years. Plutonium emits alpha particles which have weak penetrating capabilities. However,
if ingested or inhaled, even very small amounts have been proven to cause cancer.
Nuclear waste classification for high-level and low-level depends on the process which

produced the waste. Transuranic isotopes in spent fuel rods from commercial nuclear
reactors are considered high-level. However, nuclear weapons production has classified
transuranic waste as a separate category called 'TRU" waste. MAKH1JANI, supra note 18, at
9-11. In fact, transuranic isotopes are also found in so-called low-level waste. Id. at 22.
48. DOE National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-164, § 213(a), 93 Stat. 1265 (1979).

49. Portsmouth Uranium Enrichment Complex in Ohio was the last congressionally
authorized DOE nuclear weapons site approved by Congress. Portsmouth began operations
in 1956. COYLE, supra note 33, at 12.
50. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994); Clean Air
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-17 (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43
(1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §9 6901-6992 (1994);
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994).
51. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2163 (1994).
52. Procurement Hearing, supra note 40, at 42 (letter from Melvin Price to Hon. Tom
Bevill, July 18, 1979).

53. § 213(a), 93 Stat. at 1265 (1979).
54. See § 213, 93 Stat. 1259 (1979).
55. See supra note 50.
56. § 213, 93 Stat. at 1264.
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The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) was the first
general federal environmental law hurdle for the WIPP site.' FLPMA's
temporary administrative land withdrawal provision allows the Secretary
of Interior, at the request of another agency, to withdraw federal land
from public use if the land is not withdrawn for more than 20 years.
By using a patchwork of these administrative land withdrawals to
establish jurisdiction over the WIPP site, DOE surveyed, designed,
excavated and constructed the WIPP underground storage area. The land
withdrawals were also used for the above ground receiving and
administrative buildings."
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required that
DOE show that WIPP's irretrievable commitment of resources would not
cause environmental and cultural harm. DOE started the process of
compliance with NEPA by preparing an Environmental Impact Statement
in 1980 and a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement in 1990. 60
A third Environmental Impact Statement is planned for late 1996.
For several years, some uncertainty existed about whether WIPP,
as a disposal facility for radioactive materials, must also comply with
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste
restrictions. In July, 1986, EPA issued a notice which clarified the status
of hazardous constituents of radioactive mixed wastes.' The notice
declared that these wastes would be subject to regulation under Subtitle
C of RCRA of 1976.1 Since" most of the wastes designated for disposal
57. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1717 (1994).
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994).
59. WIPP includes disposal areas located 2150 feet underground as well as above
ground waste handling buildings. 41 Fed. Reg. 54,994-95 (1976) (application for withdrawal
of 17,200 acres of land in Eddy County for two years); 43 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (1978) (two year
extension of the 1976 land withdrawal); 45 Fed. Reg. 75,768-69 (1980) (two year extension
of 1978 withdrawal of 8,960 acres of federal land for the purpose of conducting a Site and
Preliminary Design Validation (SPVD) program at WIPP); 48 Fed. Reg. 3878-79 (1983) (two
year withdrawal of 8,960 acres of federal land and 1,280 acres of state land, if acquired by
the federal government, for the purpose of constructing WIPP: "no radioactive waste will
be stored or disposed of under terms of this withdrawal... "); 48 Fed. Reg. 31,038-39 (1983)
(eight year withdrawal of 8,960 acres of federal land and 1,280 acres of state land, if
acquired by the federal government, for the construction of full facilities at the WIPP site:
"no transportation, storage, or burial of any radioactive materials. . ."); 54 Fed. Reg. 15,81415 (1989) (partial termination of 1983 withdrawal (PLO6403) and "modification to change
the pu
.. .[to authorize] conducting of a test program by DOE using retrievable
radioactive waste at the site").
60. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT, WASTE
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (Oct. 1980) [hereinafter 1980 FEIS) (DOE/ES-0026); DEPARTMENT OF
EN

Wy,SUPPLEMENTAL FIAL ENvOmENTAL IMPACT STATEmENT, WAsTE ISOLATION PnOT

PLANT (1990) [hereinafter 1990 SEISI.
61. 51 Fed. Reg. 24,504-05 (1986).

62. Id.
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at WIPP would be "mixed," because they contained hazardous chemical
as well as radioactive components, EPA's interpretive notice meant that
WIPP also had to comply with RCRA regulations. 3
RCRA compliance would require parallel state" and federal'
obligations. The State of New Mexico was responsible for issuing the
permit for operational activities at the site. EPA retained authority under
RCRA to determine whether WIPP could isolate the mixed wastes from the
accessible environment "for as long as they remain hazardous."' Thus,
before it could transport any hazardous waste to WIPP, DOE was required
to obtain a state hazardous waste permit to show that the wastes would not
constitute a hazard during operations, and EPA approval for a federal
RCRA No-Migration determination after demonstrating that the waste
would not migrate to the environment beyond the RCRA control unit.'
In March, 1989, DOE applied to EPA for a regulatory exemption
which would result in a temporarily waiver of the RCRA land ban
provision.60 In its application, DOE explained that mixed waste must be
tested at the facility in order to provide scientific evidence that the facility
would contain the wastes for the required regulatory period.' In April,
regulation granting a 10 year conditional
1990, EPA issued its proposed
"no-migration variance." ° The waiver allowed wastes to be brought for a
'Test Phase," but required that the wastes be retrievable.' The waiver also

63. 52 Fed. Reg. 15,937, 15,941 (1987) (DOE confirms that "all DOE radioactive waste
which is hazardous under RCRA will be subject to regulation under both RCRA and AEA
[Atomic Energy Act of 19541.").
64. 40 C.F.R. § 264.600 (1996). The New Mexico Legislature, by incorporating regulatory
requirements which are as strict as the federal RCRA requirements into its Hazardous Waste
Act, ensured that the State would have permitting authority over the hazardous wastes
destined for WIPP during WIPP's operational phase. New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-1 to 74-4-13 (Michie 1978 and 1993 RepL. Pamp.). On July 25,1990,
the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division gained RCRA permitting authority
over the transuranic mixed wastes destined for WIPP. 55 Fed. Reg. 28,397,28,397-98 (1990).
65. 40 C.F.R. § 268 (1995).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1)(C) 1994.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-1 to 74-4-13 (Michie 1978 and 1993 Repl. Pamp.); 42 U.S.C.
6901-6987 (1994). Congress removed EPA's RCRA authority over WIPP in an amendment
to the Defense Authorization Act. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,
Pub. L. No.104-201 (1996). The State of New Mexico retains RCRA authority to regulate
WIPP during the operational phase.
68. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,068-94 (1990). RCRA bans land disposal of specific toxic materials
which may not be buried underground without a No-Migration variance. EPA will issue a
no-migration variance on a showing that the wastes will not move "for as long as [they) remain hazardous." See also 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1)(C) (1994).
69. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,068-94.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 13,077.
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reserved final determination of WIPP's ability to permanently contain
RCRA land ban wastes.'
A key problem with building WIPP was the lack of standards and
criteria for evaluating WIPP's design and construction. Congress addressed
this oversight by passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA)
NWPA established, for the first time, a national policy for the safe storage
and permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
wastes.74 EPA promulgated "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level,
and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes pursuant to NWPA.""s
As soon as EPA published the standards, however, environmental
groups filed a lawsuit to challenge their validity.76 The United States Court
of Appeals for the First District vacated and remanded Subpart B of the
standards to EPA." In the absence of any other guide, however, DOE
continued to rely on the original standards to define safety parameters for
its scientific inquiry into the potential performance of WIPP as a permanent
underground facility.'
As DOE confronted one regulatory hurdle after another, New
Mexico focused its concern on transportation issues. Using the United
States Department of Transportation guidelines, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board held hearings and designated alternate routes
for WIPP trucks." Including transportation concerns in its Consultation
and Cooperation Agreements,' New Mexico negotiated for federal
liability for WIPP-related transportation accidents s' New Mexico also
demanded that NRC approve the containers which
would transport
82
transuranic waste to WIPP across New Mexico roads.

72. 55 Fed. Reg. 47,700, 47,701 (1990).
73. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1994).
74. Id.
75. See 50 Fed. Reg. 38,066 (1985).
76. See supra note 36.
77. Id. at 1293. The court held that EPA was arbitrary and capricious in promulgating
nuclear waste standards which were not as stringent as Part C of the Safe Water Drinking
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h (1994), safe drinking water standards.
78. See C and C Agreement, supra note 40, at 5.
79. See, e.g., RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, GUIENS FVR SELECTING PREFERRED HIGHWAY ROUTES IVR HIGHWAY
RourE CONTROLLED QUANTITr SHIPMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (Aug. 1992)

(DOT/RSPA/HMS/92-02).
80. See C and C Agreement, supra note 40.
81. In 1988, Congress established federal liability for extraordinary nuclear occurrences.
Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011(j)-2210 (1994). See also C and C
Agreement, supra note 40.
82. See C and C Agreement, supra note 40. See also ROBERT H. NEILL & JAMES K.
CHANNEL, POTENIAL PROBLEMS FROM SHIPMENT OF HIGH-CURIE CONTENT CONTACT-
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Scientific proof of WIPP'sability to meet legal requirements
Meanwhile scientists at Sandia National Laboratory, closely
watched by the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG),6 strove to
demonstrate that permanent, underground disposal of mixed transuranic
waste was scientifically sound."' The original National Academy of
Sciences proposal, which noted the plastic properties of salt, had hypothesized that the salt in ancient geologic formations would creep or close in
around the decaying waste barrels, forming an airtight tomb which would
naturally isolate the waste for thousands of centuries.' The plan assumed
that no additional active, institutional controls would be required to keep
the waste safely isolated from human activity, since the salt would be selfsealing and located thousands of feet underground.'
Sandia scientists discovered almost immediately that some of the
basic assumptions of the National Academy of Sciences plan were not true
at WIPP. First, the site was not dry." In 1975 an exploratory bore-hole at
the northwest comer of the originally selected site struck a pressurized
brine reservoir which forced DOE to abandon the site.m Next, EEG
discovered that the potential for gas generation from decomposing organics
in the mixed waste might produce an explosion." Scientists found that gas

HANDLED TRANSURIC (CH-TRU)WAsrE To WIPP (1983) (EEG-24).
83. DOE originally funded EEG in 1978 in a contract between DOE and the New
Mexico Environmental Improvement Division to provide New Mexico with independent

scientific evaluation of DOE's activities at WIPP. NEILL & CRANNELL, supra note 82, at I. The
National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned EEC to the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology. 102 Stat. 1918, 2073 (1988) (The shift in authority was an attempt
to make EEG more independent of political influence.). The contract was continued through
2004 by The National Defense Authorization Act of 1994. Pub. L No. 103-100,107 Stat. 1547
et seq. (1993).
84. SANDIA PA, supra note 38.
85. HEss, supra note 20, at 4.

86. Id.
87. John D. Bredehoeft, Will Salt Repositories Be Dry? 69 TRANSACTION AM GEOPHYSICAL
UNION 121 (1988). ("The idea that salt was uniformly 'dry"was revised when exploratory
drilling in the vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico encountered
brines within the Castile formation ... ").
88. LOIxESH CHATURVEDI, WIPP-RELATED GEOLOGICAL Issuus, in NEw MEXICO
GEOLOGICAL SocIETy GuDEBOOK, 44TH FIELD CON1MwNCE 331,336 (1993). (Borehole WIPP12 hit brine at a depth of 3016 ft. Brine started flowing out of the well at a rate of 35 gallons
per minute and more than 1.14 million gallons of brine flowed out before the well was

controlled. Reservoirs at WIPP-12 and AWARDEE-6 boreholes were estimated to contain 17
million and 630,000 barrels respectively.).
89. See generally MATTHEW SILVA, AN ASSENT OF THE FLAMMABILITY AND EXPLOSION
POTENTIAL OF TRANSURANIC WASTE (1991) (EEG-48).
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pressure could change the closure predictions for the salt." Furthermore,
although generally termed a salt bed formation, the Permian Basin salt
deposits possess unique characteristics which needed to be understood.'
The relationship between clay layers and salt posed another unanswered
question about WIPP's permeability.' The presence of unmined oil and
gas reserves at the site raised the problem of inadvertent human
intrusion from exploratory boreholes of future mineral explorations."
Finally, the deformation behavior of bedded" salt deposits was not
anticipated. Instead of gently caving in, salt at WIPP fractured in large

chunks.9'

Scientists at Sandia and other DOE facilities took a can-do attitude
toward these unexpected discoveries, developing improved computer
modeling, proposing to develop improved sealing designs, and designing
experiments in gas generation, room closure and plutonium solubility in
brine.' DOE hoped the investigations would answer the questions posed
by the unexpected information revealed by the excavation and scientific
analysis. In addition, DOE convened expert panels to analyze the likelihood
of inadvertent human intrusion and to develop warning systems for future
generations."
90. Lokesh Chaturvedi & Matthew Silva, An Evaluation of the Proposed Tests with
Radioactive Waste at WIPP 600-09 (1992).
91. KENNETH S.JOHNSON &SERGE GONZALES, SALT DEFosr INTHE UNITED STATES AND
REGIONAL GEOLOGIc CHARAcTICs IMPORTANT FOR STORAGE OF RADIOACIvE WASTE 1-2
(1978) (Y/DWI/SUB-7414/1).
92. SANDLA PA, supra note 38, at 5-14. (Clay is an impermeable boundary. However,
clay posed questions about stability.).
93. The WIPP Final Environmental Impact Statement of 1980 estimated that crude oil
reserves at WIPP were nonexistent, 1980 FEIS, supra note 60, at tbl. 9-14, overlooking
available information which showed that the resource was present in abundant quantities.
ROBERT H. Nu. ET AL, REvIEW OF THE WIPP DRAFT APPUCATION TO SHOW COmANE
WITH EPA TRANsuRANIc WASTE DISPOSAL STANDARDS xvi (1996) (EEG-61).
94. See, e.g., SANDIA PA, supra note 38, at 4-34 to 4-36; See also NEW MEICO BUREAU OF
MINES AND MINERAL RESOURcES, FINAL REPORT: EvALUATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES AT THE
WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) SrE (1995).
95. Bedded salt is salt layered with clay deposits.
96. In 1991, DOE recorded the fall of a 1,500 ton slab measuring 150 feet lon& 33 feet
wide and 8 feet thick in a test room. The slab was the second recorded in a year. Peter

Eichstadt, Giant Rock Slabs Fallfrom WIPP Ceiling Causes Concern, THE NEW MEXICAN, Feb.
6,1991, at BI. Mining engineers have devised a supplementary roof support which gives
some stability to the roof and some warning for a fall. WASTE ISOLATION PrioT PLANT SUPPLEMENTARY ROOF SUPPORT SYSTEM UNDERGROUND STORAGE AREA PANEL 1, ROOM 1, 1-1 to
2-1 (1991) (DOE/WIPP 91-057, Revision 0).
97. SANDIA PA, supra note 38.
98. See generally STEVEN C. HORA ET AL., EXPERT JUDGMENT ON INADVERTENT HUMAN
INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE ISOLATION PILT PLANT (1991) (SAND90-3063); See also
KATHLEEN M. TRAUTH Er AL., EXPERT JUDGMENT ON MAnxERs To DETER INADVERTENT
HUMAN INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE ISOLATnON PLOT PLANT (1993) (SAND92-1382).
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Public concern about WIPP's safety
Despite reassurances by DOE, public concern about WIPP grew."
Reports about problems with another nuclear waste disposal site, Maxey
Flats, generally may have produced public suspicion about the safety of
°
nuclear waste disposal and the credibility of nuclear waste experts,0
Maxey Flats was a shallow land burial dump located in Kentucky which
was used for the disposal of plutonium and other low-level radioactive
wastes" which were generated by commercial nuclear power and
medical research.10 Prior to its opening, testimony before Congress
praised the proposed facility and promised that it would be so safe that "the
possibility of subsurface migration offsite is nonexistent. "1"s Ten years
after Maxey Rats opened, however, plutonium and other radionuclides
were discovered two miles offsite.1°4 As a result of this toxic migration,
Maxey Flats had to be closed. 10 '
DOE's credibility with respect to nuclear waste storage was not
helped by its troubled record of environmental problems.'1 6 For instance,
in 1988, a federal district court approved civil penalties against DOE
because the State of Ohio proved that DOE's actions at the Fernald Feed
Materials Plant had violated state law pursuant to the Clean Water Act."°
Scientific studies which reported the health risks of radiation
exposure, however, proved to be the most damaging to public trust. For
example, in 1988, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published its
newest study on ionizing radiation, which focused on the effects of alphaemitters like plutonium."'' NAS statistics indicated that inhalation of less

99. By 1990, 2,200 people from all over the United States submitted written and oral
testimony on the WIPP Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement public hearings. 1990
SEIS, see supra note 60, at vol 3, 2.
100. SHRADER-FRECHETTS, supra note 30.
101. MAIJqANI, supra note 18, at 22.
102. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 30, at 4.
103. KS. SHRADER-FRECHrTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY 53 (1991) (quoting Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal: Hearing on H.R. Maxey Flats Radioactive Waste Burial Site Before
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,House of Representatives, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 258 (1976) (statement of J. Neel)).
104. G. MEYER, ADVANCED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BRANCH,. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, MAXEY FLATS RADIOACTIVE WASTE BURIAL SrrE: STATUS REPORT 9
(1975).
105. Id. at 53.
106. See generally COYLE, supra note 33.
107. Ohio v. Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988), affd 904 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1990), reV'd, 503 US. 607 (1992).
108. COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZNG RADIATION, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKs OF RADON AND OTHER INTERNALLY DEFMM ALPHA-EMTTERS:
BEIR IV 1-23 (1988).
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than one-millionth of a gram of plutonium could result in lung cancer.1es
Not everyone opposed WIPP." 0 Some factions were anxious to
open WIPP because they saw the facility as an opportunity to dispose of the
radioactive waste in their communities. Senator Frank Church of Idaho,
who voted for the initial construction funds, cited two reasons for putting
WIPP on a fast track. First he argued that existing wastes were leaking into
soil and water where they were currently being stored. Second, he
concluded a disposal1 solution was essential to support future nuclear
weapons production.' '
WIPP opponents countered Senator Church's concern about the
safety of "temporary" storage facilities"' by asserting that WIPP's capacity
was insufficient for the total quantity of current and projected radioactive
waste.113 Opponents reasoned that the need to store nuclear waste would
continue and WIPP would not end the contamination caused by poorly
constructed dumping grounds located around the country. Opponents also
argued that money spent on WIPP would be better spent on a national
effort to stabilize nuclear storage in facilities which would be safe for at
least 100 years. They reasoned that during this time the nation could either

109. BEIR IV cautions: "As in earlier reports from the Committee on the Biological Effects
of Ionizing Radiations, the so-called BEIR reports, the committee cautions that the risk

estimates derived from epidemiological and experimental animal data should not be
considered precise." Id. at 4. Although scientists differ about how the data should be
interpreted, subsequent studies on animals have refuted previously held assurances that
exposure to so-called low-levels of radiation is safe. COMM. ON THE BIOLGCAL Evrscrs OF
IONIZING RADIATION, NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW
LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V 2-4 (1990). See a/so JOHN W. GOnMAN, M.D., PH.D.,
RADIATION-INDUCED CANCER FROM LOW-DOSE

EXPOSURE:

AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 1-4

(1990).
110. New Mexico Governors Jerry Apodaca, Bruce King and Gary Carruthers supported
WIPp.
111. "[Iln Idaho, we have stored vast amounts of transuranic waste from the nuclear
weapons program over the largest aquifer in the State.... For more than 10 years, the
Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and
now the Department of Energy have made promises to the people of the State of Idaho that
these wastes would be removed. It is crucial to fulfilling this promise that nuclear waste
activities for defense programs be maintained at an adequate level. There are also activities
at the Hanford Reservation in the State of Washington and at the Savannah River Reservation in South Carolina

....

125 CONG. REC. S15,187 (daily ed. June 18,1979) (statemcnt of

Sen. Church).
112. For almost a half a century Idahoans have been promised that the nuclear waste
brought to Idaho Engineering Laboratory from weapons facilities around the nation and
from the Three Mile Island accident was a temporary solution. Id.; COMPLEX CLEANUP, s"pra
note 16, at 151-53.
113. Existing Contact-Handled (CI) and RH-TRU wastes total 3,698,340 ft New CHTRU and RH-TRU are projected to total 5,524,132 ft.. Therefore, existing and projected
transuranic waste totals 9,122,472 ft.. IDB, supranote 15, at tbs. 3.1,3.8,3.13,3.15. The legal
capacity of WIPP is 6.2 million ft.. Pub. L No. 102-579, 106 Stat. at 4785 (1992).
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improve the science and safety of permanent, underground nuclear waste
disposal or, in the alternative, find a better solution for nuclear waste
disposal'"
Congresspasses the WIPP Land WithdrawalAct of 1992
Despite the continued public debate about the validity and safety
of permanent underground nuclear waste disposal, DOE proceeded with
construction and development of the WIPP site.'" By 1991, WIPP was
essentially constructed. Scientists, however, were still five to ten years away
from showing that this design, in this location, would safely isolate wastes
for 10,000 years."' DOE developed a test phase plan" 7 to bring
radioactive mixed waste to the facility for tests which DOE hoped would
confirm WIPP's compliance with environmental standards."$ WIPP
opponents contended that the test phase was a public relations move
designed to compensate for the 'lack of return on that enormous expenditure of funds.""9 Supporters of WIPP believed that since WIPP was built
and being maintained at a cost of $14 million per month, it would be
inefficient not to use the facility.'
DOE's test plan, however, faced a legal obstacle. Radioactive waste
could not come to WIPP under the specified conditions of DOE's administrative land withdrawal order.'2'

114. Other countries are considering this approach. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NuCLEAR WASTE: FOREIGN COUNTRIES' APPROACHES TO HIGH-LEvEL WASTE STORAGE AND

DISPOSAL 12-13 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (GAO/RCED-94-172).
115. See supra references and text accompanying note 59.
116. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act: Hearings on H.R.2637 Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 52-70 (1991) (statement of Leo Duffy, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Dep't of Energy).
117. Because DOE was not able to defend figures for the amount of waste necessary for
different versions of the test plan, successive plans for experiments were repeatedly
proposed and rejected. LOKESH CHAIURVEDI, EVALUATION OF THE DOE PLANS FOR
RADIOACTIVE ExPEIMENTS AND OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATION AT WIPP 2-6 (1989) (EEG-42).

118. Id.
119. Proposals Relating to the Operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico: OversightHearingbefore the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) (statement of Rep. Synar) [hereinafter WIPP in New Mexico].
120. "The facility is standing idle, at a cost of $14 million per month to the taxpayer .... ." 125 CONG. REC. H6305 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) (statement of Rep. Kyl).
121. An administrative land withdrawal is necessarily temporary. To bring radioactive
waste to WIPP, even for a test phase, required a permanent withdrawal of the land, an
action only Congress can perform. See supra note 59; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1994).
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Under FLPMA, a permanent withdrawal of more than 5,000 acres
of public land for more than 20 years requires congressional action."
Congress, however, had not passed a Land Withdrawal bill for the WIPP
site.' The number of contradictory opinions about the future of WIPP
and its development took its toll on congressional attempts to pass a WIPP
land withdrawal bill.124 Prospects for congressional legislation seemed
dim.
Faced with congressional inaction and anxious to open the facility,
Secretary of Energy Admiral James Watkins took matters into his own
hands. He asked for and obtained a modification of the existing WIPP
administrative land withdrawal from the Secretary of Interior." The
modification authorized DOE to begin testing mixed radioactive wastesat
the WIPP facility immediately. 12 - On October 3, 1991, after notifying
Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan that "all environmental permitting
requirements have been met....", Secretary Watkins received authorization
from the Department of Interior (DOI) to proceed with the test phase."2 '
New Mexico Attorney General Udall filed suit on October 9,1991
in United States District Court in Washington, D.C., to prevent what he
considered an illegal action. He asked for, among other things, a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to stop DOE from
bringing nuclear waste to New Mexico under an administrative land
withdrawal." Udall's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order was
granted on November 26,1991.'2
The confrontation between DOE and the State of New Mexico
finally pressured Congress into action.' On October 30,1992, Congress

122. 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994). Since the WIPP site is 10,240 acres and the nuclear waste
had the potential to contaminate the site for 240,000 years, WIPP opponents argued that the

test phase was a violation of FLPMA's administrative land withdrawal limitations.
123. Land withdrawal bills were introduced and failed to pass in the 100th and the 101st
Congress. See, e.g., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. S1272 (1988) and 101st Cong., 1st Sess. H.R.991
(1989).
124. See supra notes 1, 34, 111, 120; see infra notes 133, 139, 141, 148.
125. 56 Fed. Reg. 3038, 3039 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 5731 (1991) (DOI issues Public Land
Order No. 6826, which modifies the 1983 WIPP administrative land withdrawal, Public Land
Order No. 6403 to: 1) allow DOE to conduct a Test Phase at WIPP using retrievable transuranic waste, 2) provide for a six year extension of the administrative land withdrawal
through June 29,1997, and 3) allow DOE to expand its exclusive use area from 640 acres to
1,453.90 acres.).
126. Id.
127. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,923, 50,924 (1991).
128. New Mexico v. Watkins, 783 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D.D.C. 1992).
129. New Mexico ex rel., Udall, v. Watkins, Nos. Civ. A. 91-2527, Civ. A. 91-2929 (D.D.C.
1992).
130. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, supranote 130, at 4 (statement of Rep.
Kostmayer).
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approved the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of 1992."
As Senator Bennett Johnston, a Democrat from Louisiana, euphemistically
explained, "both DOE and the State of New Mexico have indicated a

preference to withdraw the land permanently through legislation" rather
than through an administrative action.'3
The WIPP Act mandates independentregulatoryreview of DOE

To placate critics who questioned the safety of permanent underground nuclear waste disposal in general, and DOE's accountability in
particular"13 Congress mandated that DOE's test and retrieval plans be
subject to independent regulation.' 34In addition, Congress made WIPP's
opening dependent upon independent approval by EPA.' To promote
this independent review, the 1992 WIPP Act required EPA to develop
objective standards 3 ' and3 criteria' for reviewing DOE's eventual
application to open WIPP.18
Legislative history for the WIPP Act indicates that Congress intended EPA to operate independently from DOE. Congress advanced three
reasons for its inclusion of this regulatory requirement. First, DOE's history
of self-regulation so far was an "environmental disaster."" Second, the
public would have no confidence in a process which involved selfregulation by DOE.Y Third, without external regulation, DOE would
manipulate the system to further its own vested interests. 4' As Congressman Spratt, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee
131. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, Pub. L No. 102-579 §§ 1-23,106
Stat. 4777 (1992).
132. 137 CONG. RBC. S15,989 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
133. ITihe public will not have confidence in DOE's waste programs so long as DOE
self-regulates in the area of environmental compliance." 125 CONG. REC H6308 (daily ed.
July 21, 1992) (statement of Rep. Sharp).
134. Pub. L No. 102-579 § 6(b)(3), 106 Stat. at 4783 (1992).
135. Pub. L. No. 102-579 § 8(d)(1)(B), 106 Stat. at-4787-88 (1992).
136. 40 C.F.R. § 191 (1995).
137. 61 Fed. Reg. 5224, 5224-45 (1996).
138. Pub. L No. 102-579 §§ 1-23, 106 Stat. at 4786 (1992).
139. "Essentially, DOE would prefer to self-regulate the WIPP project. We cannot allow
this. If there is anything that we can learn from the enviromrnental nightmare that has been
created over the past decades at the DOE weapons complex, it is that self-regulation is a
prescription for environmental disaster." 125 CONG. RiC. H6305 (daily ed. July 21, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Miller).
140. See supra note 133.
141. "Without removing DOE's ability to regulate itself, I am convinced that DOE will
continue to cut comers and manipulate the system to further its own institutional objectives
to the detriment of taxpayers, scientific integrity, and the need to find a permanent solution
to the nuclear waste problem." 125 CONG. REC. H6303 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) (statement
of Rep. Synar).
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explained, the final bill "firmly seats the Environmental Protection Agency
in place as the primary regulator and overseer of [WIPP]."'4
In addition to legislative history, both the language and structure
of the WIPP Act mandate that EPA conduct an independent WIPP
regulatory review.1 " For example, in order to promote objectivity and
independence, the WIPP Act dictated an exact schedule which required that
standards and criteria be in place prior to DOE's submittal of the WIPP
application.1 " Interestingly, the WIPP Act's exact deadline for DOE to
submit its application to EPA was seven years after "the date of the first
receipt of transuranicwaste at WIPP."'
Congress intentionally tied DOE's deadline to the date upon which
WIPP first received transuranic waste. Congress expected DOE to gain
EPA's approval for a pre-application limited test phase at WIPP.1' Since
the test phase was expected to last a minimum of five to ten years,'4 7 the
WIPP Act required final EPA standards and criteria to be in place well
before DOE submitted its WIPP compliance application.
The withdrawal of DOE's proposed test plans, however, interfered
with the WIPP Act's sequential structure and undermined the independence of EPA's rulemaking process.'" Following the test phase withdrawal, DOE conducted a continuous and intrusive campaign designed to
influence development of EPA's compliance criteria. The results of this
DOE effort proved fatal to the WIPP Act's mandate for independent
regulation. For example, although DOE commented at length about
proposed compliance criteria during public debate," DOE's input did
not end with public debate. DOE's influence over draft compliance criteria
continued during the first Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

142. 125 CONG. REC. H6305, supra note 139.

143. See generally Pub. L. No. 102-579

§9 1-23, 106 Stat. 4777 (1992).

144. Section 8(b)(1) mandates that EPA issue final disposal regulations not later than six
months after enactment of the Act. Section 88 mandates that EPA publish proposed criteria
within one year and final criteria within two years of enactment of the Act. Pub. L. No. 102579 §§ 8(b)(1), 8(c), 106 Stat. 4777, 4787 (1992).
145. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat. 4777, 4786 (1992).
146. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat. 4777, 4782 (1992).
147. WIPP in New Mexico, supra note 119, at 34 ("DOE has already announced that it is
going to take until 1997, or 10 years into the intended 25-year lifespan to show compliance."). Id.

148. "1have concluded that the previously proposed bin and alcove transuranic waste
tests at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) should not be conducted." Letter from Tom
Grumbly, DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
to Robert Sussman, EPA Deputy Administrator (Oct. 21, 1993).
149. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION AND
REC ICATION OF THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT'S COMPLIANCE wrmI THE 40 CFR PART
191 DISPOSAL REGULATIONS: RESPONSE TO COMMENTS DOCUMENT FOR 40 CFR 194 (1996)
[hereinafter RESPONSE TO COMMENTsI] (EPA 402-R-906-001).
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review.Is ° This DOE intrusion negated the impact of public participation
in the development of criteria."' As a result of these factors, EPA's
original draft compliance criteria contained significantly reduced require52
ments for waste characterization and engineered barriers."
1
Furthermore, "tampering" " by DOE continued as EPA moved
toward a final rule. Once again, DOE and OMB had ex parte negotiations
during the final review of compliance criteria."M During these sessions,
EPA relied on technical information which had not been presented during
the public review stage, as support for changes in the final rule."5

150. ENVIRONMENTAL PaOrEcnoN AGENCY, REDuNE/STRIKE-ouT VERSION 7/1/94 OMB

SuBMmION: CRrrRiA ROR THE CERTnCATION AND D

ATION OF THE WASTE ISOLATION

PIm PLANT'S COMPUANcE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS FOR THE MANAGENT mD

DISPOAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL AND TRANSURANIC RADIOACVE WASTES 40
C.F.R. 194, [hereinafter REDLINE/STR K-OUTI (RIN 2060-AE3O). (The final rule is published
at 61 Fed. Reg. 5224-45 (1996)). Several provisions hotly debated during public comment,
were resolved in favor of DOE. Id. at 22. EPA eliminated specific mention of waste
characterization inspections, Id. at 37-38. EPA eliminated specific mention of the need for
waste characterization in order to evaluate engineered barriers [examples of man-made
barriers are waste containers or repository seals) and reduced requirements for certainty in
evaluating containment, individual [release limits calculated for individual human beings)
and groundwater requirements. Id. at 88. EPA eliminated the statement that repository
design and engineering barriers are critical to evaluating removal of waste without
compromising compliance with disposal standards; EPA removed mining as a scenario. Id.
at 130-33. EPA gave quantitative credit for passive institutional controls. Id. at 138-39.
151. Congress worried about this situation but hoped the WIPP Act's careful structure
would prevent DOE manipulation. "While I am concerned with the potential for DOE to
tamper with independent scientific reviews of WIPP, I am confident that EPA's role under
this bill-and the opportunity provided for public comment and judicial review-will ensure
that safety is not compromised and money is not wasted." 125 CONG. RBC. H6308 (statement
of Rep. Sharp).
Criticism of the appropriateness of OMB's role in executive agency rulemaking is not
new. Earlier administrations gave OMB direct control over executive agency rulemaking
with no requirement for disclosure. Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981);
Executive Order 12,498 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). President Clinton repealed both Executive Order
No. 12,291 and Executive Order No. 12,498, substituting Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1993). Executive Order No. 12,866 established public disclosure requirements for
discussions with the private sector, but retained the discretion to hold privileged discussions
about rulemaking between and among executive branch agencies. Id.
152. REDLwE/STRrKF-oUT, see supra note 150.
153. 125 CONG. REc., supranote 133.
1,54. WEEKLY HIGHUGHTS (Carlsbad Area Office), week ending Dec. 15,1995 [hereinafter
HGLIGHTSJ.
155. For example, the final rule contains directives for considering influences from
mining activities based on information that EPA never submitted to the public for comment.
61 Fed. Reg. 5224,5233-34 (1996); Memorandum from MaryKruger to Air Docket No. A-9256 (Feb. 1, 1996) (on fie with NAT. RESOULRS J.).
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ANALYSIS
ChallengingDOE's influence on EPA through judicial attack on EPA's
final compliance criteria
Congress had anticipated the aforementioned scenario.m To
prevent DOE from corrupting the review process, Congress included an
express provision in the WIPP Act which provided for judicial review of
EPA's regulatory decisions.' Congress thereby provided an enforcement mechanism which enabled citizens to challenge any violation of the
WIPP Act's plain meaning and legislative intent to prevent DOE selfregulation at WIPP.1"
In addition, the WIPP Act, which expressly i " requiredW° that
EPA rulemaking follow Administrative Procedure Act (APA) procedures, 6 provided a cause of action based on due process.62 The due
process requirement for public notice and comment is central to APA
rulemaking. 13 The notice requirement mandates that the agency make
available to the public all documents significant to its final rulemaking so

156. 125 CONG. RFc., supra note 133.
157. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat, at 4795 (1992).
158. Restrictions on judicial review, however, severely limit actions in this case. The
WIPP Act specifically restricts judicial review to EPA's final action and designates all civil
suits to be brought "only in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or for
the District of Columbia." A court of appeals reviews evidence on the record. Thus, new
evidence could not be introduced at this stage. The action must be brought not later than
60 days after the Administrator's final decision. See Pub. L No. 102-579, 106 Stat. at 4794
(1992).
EPA published the final Compliance Criteria February 9, 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 5224-45
(1996). The New Mexico Attorney General, the Texas Attorney General, Concerned Citizens
for Nuclear Safety and Southwest Research and Information Center all filed suit against EPA
within the statutory 60 day period.
159. By expressly invoking APA, the WIPP Act establishes that EPA's compliance criteria
is a substantive and not an interpretive rule. Fertilizer Institute v. US.E.P.A., 935 F.2d 1303,
1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing United Technologies Corp. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 821
F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("To determine if the preamble is interpretive, the true
emphasis must be on the 'legal base upon which the rule rests'."). The distinction is
important because a substantive rule creates laws, rights, and duties, whereas an
interpretive rule does not. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 835 F. Supp. 654, 665 (D.D.C.
1993).
160. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat. at 4789 (1992).
161. 5 US.C. § 706 (1994).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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that the public may offer informed review and comment on the proposed
final rule.'"
In its final rule, EPA relied on technical data which it had not
previously presented to the public for comment.1" This practice is a
blatant violation of the APA standard.'" The test for violating the notice
rule is whether the public reasonably could have anticipated rule modifications or changes made by the agency based on the limited public record." Courts have allowed changes if the modification is a logical
outgrowth of the draft rule.'" However, in this case EPA removed mining
conditions from the rule proposed for public comment and then included
mining conditions in the final public rule.'" Evidence to support this rule
was relied on by EPA but never placed in the public record. Courts.could
reasonably conclude from this arbitrary procedure that failure to convene
a new round of proceedings to allow public comment on all data significant
to the issue of mining was reversible error."
Challenging EPA's decision under APA would be very difficult.
Under the APA, the standard of review is strict. An agency action must
be "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" to warrant reversal.'" Furthermore, the burden
of proof is particularly high because courts have stretched the logical
outgrowth test"n to affirm a final rule even if only a "germ" of the final
rule was disclosed in the proposed rule."n

164. American Medical Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129,1132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Engine

ManufacturersAss'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 20 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The
Administrative Procedure Act requires the Agency to make available to the public, in a form
that allows for meaningful comment, the data used to develop the proposed rule.");
Conferenceof State Bank Supervisors v. Cffice of Thrift Supervision,792 V.Supp. 837,843 (D.D.C.
1992) (Tlhe scientific material which is believed to support this rule should be exposed to
the review of interested parties for their comment.").
165. Kruger, supra note 155.
166. Exceptions to the APA notice rule are narrow, but do include "good cause" when
the passage of a complex and extraordinary statute justifies the agency's failure to provide
public notice on all documents. Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1237
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
167. Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509,1512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Rationales and conclusions
contained in the final rule are not a logical extension of the proposed rule.); Aeronautical
Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 928 F.2d 428, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Final rule
was a logical outgrowth of proposed rule and could therefore be reasonably anticipated.).
168. AeronauticalRadio, 928 F.2d at 446.
169. REDuNI/STRI-oTrr, supra note 150, at 130-33.
170. Kennecott Corp. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 684 F.2d 1007,1019-20 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
172. AeronauticalRadio, 928 F.2d at 446.
173. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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Nevertheless, EPA's reliance on technical data unavailable to the
public"" could be seen as an abuse of agency discretion.'" Given
congressional history on the need for an independent, objective review
of DOE's WIPP application, 7 6 EPA's failure to conduct its evaluation
within the dear parameters established by the APA'" and the WIPP
Act'" could be viewed as a fatal defect which ultimately prejudiced the
final criteria. 1" Evidence of undue influence by DOE exists within the
reviewable record made through hearings, advisory panels and invited
comments.ss Although abuse of discretion is a difficult standard to
meet, courts have held that when agencies act in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, agency decisions may be vacated."1
EPA's rulemaking raises constitutionalquestions about separationof
powers
EPA's failure to implement a direct congressional mandate raises
separation of powers issues. The WIPP process is analogous to the classic
separation of powers hypothetical in which the executive office of the
president substitutes a contradictory executive policy for an express
congressional policy. By granting OMB power to mediate DOE/EPA
conversations about the rulemaking,' and by restricting EPA's authority to act as an independent regulating agency, OMB arguably imposed

174. Kruger, supranote 155, at 130-33.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
176. See supra note 133.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
178. Pub. L. No. 102-579 § 8(c)(1), 106 Stat. 4786 (1992).
179. "[The court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and
due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
180. RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 149.
181. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental
ProtectionAgency, 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) (EPA's failure to include deadlines for permit
approval was arbitrary and capricious); Delaney v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 898 F.2d
687 (9th Cir. 1990) (EPA's waiver of contingency and conformance requirements for county
plan was arbitrary and capricious); Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 852 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (EPA's suspension of certain mining wastes from
regulation was arbitrary and capricious.).
182. Unlike the public, DOE's access to EPA's developing criteria was not restricted to
Administrative Procedure Act formal comments. The following statement reporting on the
OMB process shows that DOE played an active role in lobbying EPA for changes to the final
rule during the non public OMB review. "Preliminary evaluation of the final rule 40 CFR
194 criteria for certification and recertification of the WIPP compliance with 40 CFR 191
disposal regulations is underway. Several provisionsin the rule,as written,could have a dramatic
impact on the WIPP program." George Dials, CARLSBAD AREA OFFicE WKLY HIGHuGHTs, supra
note 154 (emphasis added).
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an executive policy on EPA which directly contradicted an express
congressional mandate.
Conflict between the role of OMB and EPA's regulatorymandate
OMB's role in facilitating EPA/DOE interaction, instead of
supporting EPA's objectivity, actually undermined EPA's ability to
maintain its independence from DOE. The problem stemmed from
contradictory mandates. In general, OMB has authority to review
individual agency rulemaking in order to prevent contradictions between
agencies.'" In theory OMB acts as a mediator between agencies, to
promote agency cooperation and project unified public policy.'" In the
case of WIPP, however, this basic OMB function actually operated in
direct contradiction to the WIPP Act mandate for independent regulation.ss Ex parte negotiations which were integral to OMB operations'" provided a means to circumvent EPA's decisions and allowed
DOE to lobby EPA for substantive changes in the compliance criteria. '
Theories of Executive Oversight
The fact that OMB could play a role in modifying direct
congressional mandates was controversial before WIPP."' Whether
OMB's role in the rulemaking was beneficial or obstructive, however,

183. "[The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA ) is the repository of
expertise concerning regulatory issues, including methodologies and procedures that affect
more than one agency...." Executive Order 12,866 directs OIRA, an office within OMB, to
review significant regulatory actions which "ICIreate a serious inconsistency or otherwise
interfere with an action taken... by another aency...... "Executive Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1993).
184. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1939,3 C.F.R. 1288 (1968), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app." 209-219
(1996); Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1970,3 C.F.R. 1070-71 (1971), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 101301 (1996); Reorg. Plan No. I of 1977, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 2
(1996).
185. Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106 Stat. at 4786-88 (1992).
186. Executive Order No. 12,866 § 6; supra note 183.
187. Kruger, supra note 155; See also REDUNE/STRII-OUT, supra note 150.
188. See, e.g., Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget
Supervision of Environmental ProtectionAgency Rulemaking under Executive Order12,191, 4 VA.
J. NAT. RESOURcES L 1 (1984) (Order may give OMB unwarranted authority to infringe on
discretion delegated by Congress), Executive Order 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1985) (OMB has
more discretion to review EPA actions for consistency with administration policies). See also
The Honorable Patricia M. Wald, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991-2 Term," 7 ADMIN. L.
J. AM. U. 238 (1993) ("[Sleparation of powers, especially executive power, is still the hottest
ticket in town. Whether the issue is standing, enforceability of Congressional intent,
legislative history to inform construction, Chevron expansion, or sovereign immunity, most
decisions this term did work in the executive branch's favor.'3.
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depends on what theory of executive power one endorses. Two contradictory theories about the extent of the President's constitutional authority
over the activities of the executive branch exist.
The Unitary Executive Theory
One theory supports a unitary executive, vesting the President
with both the removal power and policy control over executive branch
officials, subject to whatever restrictions, conditions, and caveats Congress
places within the statute.18'9 Advocates of this theory contend that the
vesting clause'" ' of the Constitution places the "totality of executive
power in the President." 91 They also contend that the take care
clause" suggests that presidential control is necessary to resolve
conflicts and overlapping jurisdictions among agencies. Under the unitary
executive theory, OMB'S role is to prevent agencies from usurping the
President's constitutional executive power.
The unitary executive theory endorses OMB's administrative
intrusion into EPA's WIPP rulemaking process. Under the unitary
executive theory, the Constitution would bar any congressional mandate
which intruded -into internal executive branch functions. The theory
would interpret the WIPP Act regulatory provisions as direction for DOE
to be regulated not just by EPA, but by the executive branch as a whole.
Practical arguments support adoption of the unitary executive
theory in order to shield EPA's final criteria from attack. First, the cost of3
maintaining WIPP during the evaluation period has been significant"
Close consultation with DOE could help EPA process the compliance
criteria application more efficiently. If EPA finds the application deficient,
EPA could directly inform DOE of potential problems. DOE could begin
immediately to work on remedying the deficiencies. If the problems
proved unsolvable, both DOE and EPA would share an understanding
of why WIPP could not open.
Second, allowing fluid conversations between EPA and DOE
promotes informed evaluation and arguably informed criteria. Since DOE
189. David B.Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and PresidentialControl of Executive Branch
Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L. I. AM. U. 309, 310 (1993); see also Stephen G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARX. L REV. 23 (1995).
190. U.S. CONST. art. U,§ 1.
191. Rivkin, supra note 189, at 318.
192. U.S. CoNSr. art. UI,§ 3.
193, In 1980, the projected total cost of WIPP including design, construction and
operation was $1 billion. 1980 FEIS, supra note 60, at 1-6. A recent estimate projects that
WIPP will cost $92 billion. Mike Taugher, Feds Up WIPP Cost Proection By $1.4 Billion,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 10, 1995, at Al, A2. In 1992, the cost of maintaining WIPP with no
waste operations was $14 million per month. 125 CONG. REC., supra note 120.
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constructed WIPP and directs the scientific inquiries into WIPP, DOE is
the agency with the most knowledge about the WIPP facility. No matter
how independent EPA tries to be, DOE contractors have more expertise
about WIPI and it's capabilities than EPA consultants. An informed
judgment about WIPP necessarily involves a complete understanding of
the reasons why DOE contractors made the choices and conclusions
contained in the application.
Third, WIPP involves decisionmaking about complex scientific
issues. A presumption exists that if any question arises about congressional intent, agency interpretations are correct. This presumption is
particularly strong when a decision involves complex technical evaluations. '" When questions arise about agency decisions in implementing
congressional mandate, courts defer to the agency's interpretation when
the situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.'"
Under this canon of construction, the WIPP application triggers
three tiers of deference. First, deference should be accorded EPA's
decision to accept DOE's application while EPA continued to work on its
compliance criteria. Second, deference should be given to DOE's decision
that sufficient proof of WIPP's viability exists to support fast tracking its
compliance application. Finally, deference should be accorded OMB's
interest in unifying public policy. All of these arguments, however,
depend on an interpretation of the WIPP Act which allows EPA
discretion to adapt compliance criteria in response to DOE concerns.1 '
If a court were to adopt the shared executive theory, less deference
would be accorded executive agencies. The shared executive theory
would likely cast a critical eye at EPA's failure to separate its rulemaking
from DOE influence.
The Shared Executive Theory
The shared executive theory envisions that the President is primus
inter pares"" with no constitutional authority to impose control over the
policy decisions of other executive branch leaders.1' Advocates of this
194. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984). The Chevron principle of deference to agency discretion only arises after courts
determine that some ambiguity exists within the statute. If the statute is clear, the court will
evaluate whether agency decisions correctly implemented the plain language of the statute.
195. Id.

196. Id.
197. Primus inter pares is Latin for first among equals.
198. Sunstein, Executive Oversight of Regulatory Procedure,7 ADMrw. J.L.AM. U.297-307
(1993); see also Lawrence Lessig &Cass R.Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54 (1994).
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theory argue that the opinions clause1 " of the Constitution implies that
presidential deference be accorded to decisions made by executive
agencies.' In addition proponents note that the necessary and proper
clause I of the Constitution further limits presidential power because it
vests Congress with considerable control over the organization of the
judicial and executive branches.' Under this shared executive theory,
OMB's mediator role inappropriately intrudes into the right of executive
branch agencies to autonomously implement congressional policy.
The shared executive idea provides a theoretical framework
which supports arguments against DOE's intrusion into EPA's independent compliance criteria process. One argument is that since EPA's
probabilities for WIPP's success are value laden the agency should
take an objective judicial role in evaluating contradictory evidence.'
The need for objectivity in EPA's evaluation of DOE's process would
seem to be particularly important because methodological value
judgments are inherent in DOE's probable risk assessment task.' The
consequences of DOE's manipulation of EPA's review could at best result
in approval of an inadequate disposal facility, and could at worst
generate false information to other projects.'
Other arguments which support regulatory autonomy are not
based on science or efficiency. These concerns stem from a basic distrust
of WIPP's safety and a consequent concern for careful review of DOE's
science. For example, without some objectivity, it will be impossible to
ascertain whether WIPP opened because of political pressure, or because

199. U.S. COsT. art. I, § 2.
200. Sunstein, supra note 198, at 297.
201. US. CONST. art. I, § 18.
202. Sunstein, supra note 198, at 297.
203. EPA standards only require DOE to show a probability that no more than a certain
fraction of radioactivity will reach the accessible environment. Because of the length of the

10,00 year regulatory period (twice as long as human beings have recorded history), large
uncertainties are inherent in the scope and task of predicting changes in geological and
hydrological movements, climatic changes and particularly human factors such as population numbers and migrations or even what people will eat or drink.
204. RosERT H. NEILL uT AL, REviEw OF THE WIPP DRAFT APPuCATION TO SHOW
mPANCE
wim EPA TRANSuRANIC WASTE DPOSAL STANDARDs, xii-xvii (1996) [hereinafter EEG-611 (EEG-61). To reduce the amount of uncertainty inherent within the
regulatory process, EPA included assurance requirements as part of the standard. 40 C.F.R.
191.14 (1995) (for example, institutional controls and monitoring, engineered barriers, and
mitigation against the effects of the presence of valuable minerals at the site). To date, DOE
has not adequately addressed any of EPA's assurance requirements. See EEG-61 at xv.
205. 40 C.F.R. 191 (1995).
206. See GENERAL ACcouNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR WASTE: FOREIGN COUNTRIES'
APPROACHES TO HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL (1994) thereinafter GAO
CO

FOREIGN WASTE) (GAO/RCED-94-172).
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DOE truly demonstrated the reliability of the facility. Political pressure
to open WIPP is very real. Since its authorization in 1979, Congress has
invested $2.5 billion in WIPP.' As noted above,' nuclear weapons
production is a huge national investment. Political pressure from within
DOE to open WIPP, despite the uncertainty of its science, is enormous.
Indeed, political pressure on DOE to open WIPP extends beyond
military concerns to a larger commercial nuclear industry. A failure at
WIPP undoubtedly would affect ongoing plans to bury commercial
nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain.' The expectations of a wide range
of educational, political and economic interests would be disappointed.no Therefore, having promised to demonstrate the validity of
permanent underground nuclear waste disposal,211 the Department is
under enormous pressure from diverse constituencies to deliver.
Another factor which supports the argument for EPA autonomy
is caution. Any decision to open WIPP is for all practical purposes
irreversible.1 2 The compliance application does require DOE to develop
207. In 1992 WIPP had cost $22 billion and was estimated to continue at a cost of $14
million per month. 125 CONG. RBC. H6302 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Rhodes). However, the cost may be somewhat higher, At $14 million per month WIPP
should cost $168 million per year. Nevertheless, 1995 appropriations for WIPP were
$174,323,000. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 1995: PROGRESS AND
PLNS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 74 (1995) (DOE/EM-0228).

208. Schwartz, supra note 11.
209. In 1987, Yucca Mountain became the only high-level waste site to be considered for
permanent disposal of spent fuel rods from largely commercial nuclear power plants. 42
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1987). Located in southern Nevada, the facility has been repeatedly delayed
by scientific concerns about its viability. The most recent (1990) total-system life cycle cost
estimates for Yucca Mountain and possible other repositories range from $25.6 billion to
$34.6 billion (in constant 1988 dollars). DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FISCAL YEAR 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 62 (1995) (DOE/RW-0464). Yucca Mountain will not be ready to open

until 2015 at the earliest. GAO FOREIGN WASTE, supra note 206, at Appendix 1,18.
210. The US. Council for Energy Awareness [hereinafter USCEA] is an organization
which publicly supports nuclear energy, and underground disposal of nuclear waste.
USCEA's 1991 Annual Report shows that members embrace a wide variety of economic,
geographic and political interests: 177 businesses including General Electric, Bechtel,
Westinghouse, Merrill Lynch, Siemens Power Corp., Squibb Diagnostics, and Teledyne,
among others; 45 colleges and universities in over 30 states including Harvard, University
of New Mexico, Stanford, MIT, and Texas A & M, 59 public utility companies; and 4 labor
unions, including AFL-CIO's Building, Construction and Trades and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
211. CARLSBAD AREA OFFIcE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN (1995)

[hereinafter CAO STRATEGIC PLAN) (DOE/WIPP-95-1149).
212. Despite the requirement for a retrieval plan, 40 C.F.R. 191.14(0 requires retrievability, but does not require that retrievability be easy. DOE's application side-steps retrieval. DEPARTMENT'OF ENERGY, DRAFT TITLE 40 CFR 191 COMPLANCE CERTIFICATION APPLICATION FOR THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (1995) (DOE/CAO-2056). Because the salt

deposits will cave in around the barrels and crush them, the waste to be buried at WIPP
will eventually mix with the salt. After the barrels lose their integrity the waste mixes with
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a retrieval plan if necessity demands it.3 However, DOE maintains that
cost and worker safety considerations dictate that retrieval would only be
practical in extraordinary circumstances," This reality indicates that
waste burial is for all practical purposes irreversible. The irreversible
nature of EPA's approval, then, would argue for front-end caution and
insistence upon independent review.
The debate between advocates of the unitary executive and the
shared executive theories has far-reaching implications for OMB's role in
controlling executive agency rulemaking that has been authorized by
Congress. Advocates for the unitary executive theory say that integrated
regulatory decisionmaking, accountability, and the benefit of policy
insights beyond the individual agency all argue for presidential oversight."5 However, advocates of the shared executive role counter that
"there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the
President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his
statutory duty in a particular instance .... 216
As this discussion shows, the debate is unresolved. Congress has
been concerned about OMB's imposition of delay on executive agencies," 7 but has not raised the issue of OMB's role as a violation of
separation of powers. Similarly, courts have used separation of powers
doctrines to justify judicial restraint in questioning executive branch

decisionmaking 1 Courts will evaluate whether the agency's decision

complies with statutory obligations not whether OMB has intruded into
the decisionmaking process. 9 The general rule for executive agencies
like EPA is that unless an agency has violated an express congressional

the salt and the waste becomes hard to safely or economically retrieve. Relying on EPA's
assurance that "it only need be technologically feasible ... to mine the sealed repository,"
DOE states: "The WIPP isa mined repository. No additional actions to meet this
requirement are necessary, and none are-planned." CARLOAD AREA OF F, DEPARTENT
OF ENERGY, COMPLuANCE sTATus REPoRT IVR THE WA E ISOLATON PI
PLANT (1994)
(DOE/WIPP 94-019, Revision 0).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Rivkin, supra note 189, at 309.
216. Myers v. United States, 272 US. 52f 135 (1926) (Justice McReynolds dissenting).
217. See generally Office of Management and Budget Influence on Agency Regulation,
Subcommittee on LegislationandNational Security, SenateCom.on Environmentand Public Work,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
218. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (Separation of powers counsels against seeking
to restructure the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.).
219. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol3

mandate, courts must defer to executive agency interpretation of the
statute.2M
As a result of judicial deference to executive agencies, a court
probably would not reach the doctrine of separation of powers unless the
court first determined that EPA had violated an express mandate of the
WIPP Act. If a court concluded that Congress was unclear in its
requirement that EPA conduct an autonomous review of WIPP, then the
Chevron principle of deference would apply"' and a court probably
would not reach the question of whether EPA, DOE, and OMB negotiations were within executive branch discretion by the terms of the WIPP
Act. If, however, a court concluded that the WIPP Act clearly limits
presidential control,m then a court could question the scope and
constitutional authority of OMB's actions.'
Statutory limits sharply restrict EPA's autonomy as an independent
regulatingagency
The importance of analyzing EPA's ability to regulate DOE extends
beyond compliance with rulemaking criteria. Arguably EPA's final
determination of WIPP certification based on DOE's compliance application
also constitutes a rulemaking. EPA's ultimate decision about whether
WIPP could open would trigger another OMB review. Therefore, EPA's
ability to thwart DOE influence is not limited to the compliance criteria
rulemaking. EPA's independence from DOE will arguably be a factor in
any future OMB review of EPA's final authorization for opening WIPP.
The question of EPA's functional independence involves the
nature of EPA's statutory autonomy within the executive branch. Despite
clear congressional intent to designate EPA as an independent regulatory
agency over DOE, EPA does not have enough statutory independence
within the executive branch to maintain an independent regulatory
stance. EPA is a presidentially created agency established to advocate for
and coordinate environmental concerns.' The President retains power
to appoint and remove the EPA Administrator.' Furthermore, since

220. Id.

221. Id.
2. See, e.g., Governorsof U.S.P.S. v. U.S.P.S., 654 F.2d 108,114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Postal
Rate Commission may not change decision of Board of Governors.); Leonardv. U.S.P.S., 489
P2d 814, 817-18 (istCir. 1974) (USPS decisions are not subject to Department of Justice
veto.).
223. Rivkin, see supra note 189; see also Sunstein, supra note 200.
224. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072-75 (1971) reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. 881-7
(19%).
225. Angel Manuel Moreno, PresidentialCoordinationof the Independent RegulatoryProcess,
8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 461 (1994). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that
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EPA performs regulatory functions which are vital to the nation's
economy, OMB reviews, alters and approves EPA's budget before
sending it to Congress.' The presidential powers to fire the administrator and to alter appropriation requests for specific regulatory programs
diminish the regulatory independence of EPA within the executive
branch. The President's need for cost efficiency and unified public policy
may compromise EPA's ability to regulate.'
EPA's status contrasts with other independent regulatory agencies
which enjoy more extensive regulatory autonomy.'m In the hierarchy of
independent agencies, NRC enjoys more independence from executive
control than does EPA.' The President only can fire NRC commissioners for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.' In
addition, a provision which stipulates that no more than three out of five
NRC members can be from the same political party limits the President's
ability to appoint commissioners sympathetic to executive policy."
Furthermore, NRC submits proposed agency rules to the "Regulatory
Analysis Review Group" on a voluntary rather than a mandatory
basis. 2
Although independent regulatory agencies like NRC retain
various degrees of autonomous control over several critical administrative
functions, the President does retain critical authority to control even
independent regulatory agencies.3 Among these presidential controls
are, first, the requirement that agencies submit legislative recommendacongressional authority to fire the director of the Office of the Comptroller General constituted sufficient power over the comptroller general to find improper retention of
congressional power).
226. Moreno, supra note 225, at 479, 500.
227. See, e.g., N.R.D.C. v.U.S.E.?.A., 824 F.2d 1146.
228. For a discussion of the difference between EPA's status as an "independent agency"
and the status of "independent regulatory agencies" within the executive branch, Moreno,
see supra note 225, at 474 (Moreno identifies the eleven most important agencies as enjoying
the more autonomous status of "independent regulatory agency': the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the United States International Trade Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
229. Moreno, supra note 225, at 511.
230. Id. at 477.
231. R.H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Rein-venting the Regulatory State, 62 U. COn. L. REV.
1, 40-41 (1995) (Public trust varies among other factors according to the nature of the actor,
e.g. industry or physician, and the location or nature of the community.). This restriction in
practice seems to have little real effect in reducing commission support of presidential
policy. Id. at 29 n.108.
232. Moreno, supra note 225, at 489-90.
233. Moreno, supra note 225, at 498-500.
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tions to the president before offering them to Congress, second, the
control of resources and operational aspects of day to day administration;' third, the power to appoint or remove commissioners,'
fourth, the ability to appoint or remove chairs or administrative
directors, 7 fifth, presidential authority to reorganize the executive
branch,2m sixth, the power to submit budget requests to Congressw
and; seventh, the power to decide when and how to litigate enforcement
of regulatory programs.'
Suggestions for more autonomous regulationof WIPP certification
With the designation of EPA as regulator over WIPP, it would
seem that history passed beyond previous congressional concerns about
a civilian agency regulation of military nuclear waste disposal. 1
Arguably NRC is in a better position to independently regulate DOE than
is EPA.
One solution to the problem of EPA's lack of autonomy in
compliance criteria rulemaking, then, would be for Congress to redesignate NRC as the WIPP regulator. Several factors, however, indicate that
this development is unlikely. Beyond the obvious problems of consistency
for the. WIPP review process, the problem of placing NRC as a regulator
over DOE remains problematic. Congress continues to separate regulation
of military and commercial nuclear activities.'
Given congressional reluctance to merge the authority over
military and commercial nuclear facilities, an alternative plan would be

234. Id. at 500 (some independent agencies "enjoy statutory or traditional bypass
provisions").
235. Id. (General Accounting Services Administration and the Office of Personnel
Management maintain control over facilities and personnel of most independent agencies.).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (This power is also subject to congressional authorization. Without some
statutory independence an independent regulatory agency can be created or terminated by
presidential reorganization of the executive branch.).
239. Id. (The President's authority to establish budget estimates of the federal
government for the fiscal year squarely places budgetary discretion over executive agencies
within presidential power.).
240. Id. (Power to control litigation implicates policy as well as control over prolonging
rulemaking. In general the U.S. Attorney General retains this authority with respect to
independent regulatory agencies. However, some agencies retain limited enforcement and
appeal powers.).
241. Pub. L.No. 102-579, 106 Stat. 4777 (1992) (giving EPA regulatory authority over
WIPP); see ProcurementHearing, supranote 41.
242. Congress bifurcated high-level nuclear waste standards, giving EPA authority over
WIPP, but authorizing separate standards for Yucca Mountain. 10 C.F.R. 52.97 (1992).
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for Congress to establish an independent regulatory agency within the
executive branch and parallel to NRC with limited presidential control
over its authority to conduct rulemaking, adjudication and approval of
future military nuclear waste repositories.' One advantage of this
proposal includes a strong message to DOE and the executive branch that
Congress requires watchful regulation of these dangerous nuclear waste
facilities. The disadvantages include increased bureaucracy, its inevitable
cost, and the time lost while the new agency masters the regulatory task.
The shared executive model promotes public accountability in rulemaking
The most persuasive argument for endorsing the shared executive
model and limiting presidential oversight of agency rulemaking2 " is the
critical need for accountability in the regulatory arena.'" As Peter
Shane, Dean of the Pittsburgh School of Law explains, "if the President
were to enjoy more and more complete control over content of domestic
policy, then the weaker the identifiable link would become between
legislator effectiveness and government performance."2' Courts have
recognized the importance of preserving political accountability within
our majoritarium government.'4 EPA's lack of statutory independence
obscures political accountability for congressional nuclear waste policy.

243. EPA's environmental advocacy mandate is philosophically consistent with the idea
of keeping this independent agency within EPA. However, before such a decision is made,
serious consideration should be given to limiting the president's ability to control the
agency's regulatory independence through the above-mentioned conditions. Moreno, supra
note 225, at 500-04.
244. Limiting the President's control over an independent regulatory agency raises the
unitary executive theory policy concern about the cost associated with inefficiency in
bureaucratic management. However, recent criticism of "control and command" environmentl regulation suggests that hierarchical control over governmental agencies is only one
factor in reducing costs. Other devices could be more effective. For example, implementing
feedback systems into regulatory programs, identifying and distinguishing between longterm and short-term risks, and developing incentives for behavior changes (including
incentives not to litigate) may also significantly reduce regulatory costs and compensate for
any loss of management efficiency. Pildes, supra note 231, at 96-99. See also E. Donald Elliott,
TQM-ing OMB: or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and
What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & COmTM. PRoes. 167-84 (1994).
245. See generally Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and
Balances: The Case of PresidentialReview of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L REV. 161-214 (1995).

246. Id. at 209.
247. New York v. United States, 505 US. 144,169 (1992) ("[wlhere the Federal Government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus

diminished[.]").
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Political accountability is further threatened when OMB's activities blur
the relationship between congressional authorization and executive implementation of environmental regulation.w
Although the framers of the Constitution could not have
anticipated the nuclear age, they were very concerned about fairness and
accountability in public decisionmaking. As James Madison explained:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate
and virtuous citizen, equally the friends of public and private
faith and of public and personal liberty, that our governments
are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the
conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of
the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority.P9
These words foreshadow current problems posed by the vested interests
of the military-industrial complex. In 1787 the framers counted on an
equal tension between vested "landed" interests to temper the interests of
the "mercantile" class.m Furthermore, the power of the states to restrict
a powerful federal government was assumed."1 The framers believed
that federal government power was unlikely to be unchecked. As
Alexander Hamilton notes:
It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition
in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they
are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers
would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the
possession of them for that reason, would contribute nothing
to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the
national government.=
Therefore, despite a concern that powerful private interests might control
government decisions, the framers did not provide for checks within the
248. Giving a non-elected independent regulatory agency autonomy from an elected

president may seem ironically nonmajoritarian. However, the goal is to clarify implementation of congressionally mandated policy. The layered veils of presidential oversight
in environmental rulemaking obscure accountability about how the agency has taken public

input into account. Therefore, the shared executive model, depends on a direct accountability from the agency to the public. In this model courts might apply a more critical review
of agency abuse of discretion. Presidential checks for inefficiency, neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office could be retained. Moreno, supra note 225, at 513.
249. THE FiDAu-r No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Penguin 1961).
250. THE 'DELu-rNo. 60, at 369 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin 1961).
251; THE FEDERAUsr No. 17, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penquin 1%1). ("It will always
be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than

for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities."). Id.
252. Id.
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executive branch. If the framers had imagined the unified power of
today's military-industrial complex, the aforementioned references
suggest that they might have taken steps to check the superior force of
this interested and overbearing majority. In any case, the framers clearly
intended to ensure federal governmental accountability.
Today the public is just as concerned about political accountability as were the framers. Frustration over the current lack of political
accountability in EPA's regulatory role' fosters widespread distrust
and public opposition to WIPP. In the past, opponents were vocal,
insistent, persistent, and effective.3 Public outcry was particularly
effective in delaying WIPP's opening" and in insisting that no radioactive materials be brought to WIPP without a congressional land withdrawal.256 Because of the widespread concern about WIPP's safety,
EPA's failure to provide objective evaluation of DOE's WIPP compliance
application will not go unnoticed. EPA's lack of accountability could
resistance to future attempts at resolving
generate widespread public
7
nuclear waste problems.2
One reason for public distrust is the nascent status of nuclear
waste technology. To penetrate the shadow of concern about the validity
of underground nuclear waste disposal, government decisions must
involve the public in periodic reviews. Nuclear waste disposal facilities
are cost intensive, long-term projects. The length of time that passes

253. See generally Pildes, supra note 231, at 41.
254. In a 1992 poll conducted by the New Mexico Environmental Law Center, 40% of
those polled responded "WIPP" when asked to name the environmental issue which most
concerned them. The next highest concern was "water," mentioned by only 26% of
respondents. RESEARCH & POLLING, INC., NEW MExico ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER,
ATTITUDES OF NEW MEIaCANS TOWARD FEDERAL AND STATE MINING LAWS AND RECLAMATION, INCLUDING REORM OF THE 1872 MINING LAW (1992).

255. DOE first promised to open WIPP in 1988. 1980 FEIS, supra note 60, at 1-6. Public
insistence on DOE accountability, particularly with respect to complying with existing state
and federal laws, prevented DOE from bypassing Congressional action on a WIPP land
withdrawal. 56 Fed. Reg. 3038, 3039 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 5731 (1991); see supra, note 125.
256. For example, the October 1993 withdrawal of DOE's test phase before EPA's
decision about its direct relevance to compliance presumably was based in part on a
response to the July 1993 DOE forum which included representatives from Indian tribes,
concerned citizens, governors, congressional members, the National Academy of Science,
and Westinghouse. See Meeting Summary Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Program Review (July 30,
1993) (held at the J.W. Marriott Hotel, Wash. D.C.).
257. See DEARThNrr OF ENERGY NATIONAL TRANsURANiC PROGRAM PLAN 1-1 (1994)

[hereinafter NATIONAL TRUI (DOE/NTP-94-1040).
258. The history of other long-term cost intensive military projects does little to boost
confidence in cursory WIPP oversight. See eg., Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, ($25
billion from 1969-76) canceled because high operational costs eclipsed limited defensive
benefits; XB-70IRS-70 Valkyrie Bomber ($9 billion from 1957-60) canceled by President
Eisenhower due to concerns over interservice rivalry and lack of a clear mission-revived as
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between the original congressional authorization and the eventual
operational implementation, means that Congress's original authorization
cannot possibly take into account the information obtained during the
compliance review. Therefore, before construction and operation, an
independent regulatory agency should conduct a public review of all
scientific and technical conclusions which argue for implementation. The
independent agency should be given additional authority to include in
its review a final evaluation of the necessity of each new repository.
A precedent for such a review exists in the public service area in
the form of Certificates of Convenience and Necessity (CCN).3 Public
utilities must have an approved CCN before they can construct a new
facility.' Important factors for granting a CCN are, first, an inquiry
into whether there is a public need for expanding services, and second,
an evaluation of whether expanding services is a significant improvement
over existing services. "
Since the federal government retains control over nuclear waste
repositories, the CCN review for military nuclear waste repositories
appropriately would be within the authority of the federal independent
regulatory agency.' Moreover, such a review would be considered
adjudication requiring a trial type hearing.
Currently the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires
public review of major actions contemplated by federal agencies." The
NEPA process ensures that, before irreversibly committing national
resources, an agency take a hard look at all reasonable alternatives to the
a political maneuver to help Richard Nixon in California in the 1960 election left to languish
and die under President Kennedy; AircraftNuclear Propulsion(ANP) ($6 billion from 1946-61)
canceled due to poor management, technical problems and lack of a clear mission; Safeguard
C atmospheric nuclear testing readiness capability ($1.6 billion from 1964-1993) canceled when
Congress was made aware of its continued existence; Proposed restart of the Savannah River
Site production reactors ($2 billion from 1988-1992) canceled when DOE and DOD reevaluated their need for new tritium; MX railgarrisonbasingplan ($2 billion from 1988-1991)
canceled after heavy and sustained public and congressional opposition; Skybolt air-launched
missile ($2.1 billion from 1955-1962) canceled due to poor test results; Nuclear Engine for
Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) ($2.7 billion from 1961-1972) canceled due to lack of a
clearly defined mission; Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion ($6 billion from 1946-1961) canceled due
to poor management, technical problems and the lack of a clear mission. See Schwartz,
ATOMIC AuDrr,supra note 11.
259. See, e.g., W. Jones, Originsof the Certificateof PublicConvenience and Neceisity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLuM. L REv. 426 (1979).
260. Since WIPP has already been built, requiring a CCN may be moot. However, the
CCN process would be useful in resolving public polarization of opinion about future
nuclear waste repositories.
261. Jones, supra note 259, at 427.
262. Traditionally CCN's are issued at the state level. Jones, supra note 259, at 430.
263. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551, 554 (1946).
264. 42 U.S.C. 4331 (1994), 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
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proposed action before recommending in a record of decision which
alternative to implement.20 At the heart of NEPA is the insistence on
public accountability for government action.? . NEPA, however, only
enforces procedural accountability.2 7 A CCN review would not substitute for NEPA. Rather the CCN process would take place subsequent to
the agency's NEPA record of decision, putting enforcement teeth into
evaluating the merits of the NEPA decision.?
The shared executive model is particularly important when one
government agency regulates another government agency. EPA's WIPP
Act mandate carries a heavy burden, requiring EPA to regulate a cabinetlevel government department.' Furthermore, the specificity of the
WIPP Act in delineating EPA's WIPP regulatory responsibilities would
indicate that EPA's duties are peculiarly and specifically committed to the
agency.' ° For these reasons, EPA's mandate requires more political
accountability' and administrative independence.' Therefore any
proposed independent regulatory agency which would shoulder EPA's
present mandate should have relative autonomy within the executive
office of the president.
CONCLUSION
Although the prospects for correcting the perceived or actual
damage caused by DOE's influence over EPA's compliance criteria are
dim, courts should nevertheless review this question. The WIPP project
is a contemporary illustration of the problems pose by government

265. See generally id.
266. Id.
267. Furthermore, as seen above, the APA substantive review will only question agency
decisions if they are arbitrary and capricious. Arguably the irretrievable nature of
permanent underground disposal of nuclear waste requires a stricter standard of review.
Rather than disturbing general laws like NEPA and APA which apply to many retrievable
actions, this paper recommends the CCN process to strengthen the NEPA and APA process
with respect to permanent nuclear waste disposal decisions.
268. See generally NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370d (1994).
269. Independent agencies traditionally regulate private, industrial or public service
companies. The more closely the independent regulatory agency comes to regulating

government, the more independence it seems to have. Therefore, the Federal Reserve Board,
regulating government chartered banks, has more independence than, for instance, EPA. See
generally Moreno, supra note 225; Jones, supra note 259.
270. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135.
271. See generally Peter Shane, PoliticalAccountability in a System of Checks and Balances:

The Case of PresidentilReview of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L REv. 161-214 (1995).
272. See generally Moreno, supra note 225.
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projectsmwhich typically take a long time and involve large sums of
money.
The enormous cost of WIPP, like other long-term nuclear projects,
has worked to undermine original intentions in two ways. First, as the
project progressed, the demand for cost efficiency began to eclipse the
original concerns for health and safety.' 4 Second, the nature and
enormity of the research, so necessary to verify the scientific validity of
the NAS premise, eventually produced vested interests which now lobby
for its continuance. Political pressure from vested interests, both
governmental2" and private 276 also may prejudice intermediate decisions to proceed with implementation even when very little scientific
evidence exists for continuing the project.tm The enormous political and
economic power vested in the military-industrial complex and the
irretrievable nature of the decision to emplace nuclear waste at WIPP,
caution against unquestioning acceptance of such governmental inertia.
Failure to insist on political accountability in this developing nuclear
waste field could allow undue influence to overrule objective decisonmaking. The result could mean the erosion of governmental checks and
balances which ensure our health and safety, and even our fundamental
liberties.
MARGRET CARDE

273. See text and accompanying citations supra note 258.
274. See generally Donald E. Elliott, TQM-ING OMB: or Why Regulatory Review Under
Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAw
& CONTe. PROBs. 167-84 (1994).
275. 125 Cong. Rec., see supra note 139 (statement of Rep. Miller).
276. DOE's nuclear weapons complex is operated by hundreds of private contractors
including Westinghouse Electric Corp., General Electric Corp., Bechtel Corp., EG&G,
Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Corp., Martin Marietta Corp., Mason and Hanger-Silas
Mason Co. Inc., Fluor Daniel, and Morrison-Knudson Corp. See Schwartz, BROOKINGS supra
note 9. In addition, the enormous involvement of corporations, universities, public utilities,
and labor unions in other government-supported nuclear activities inevitably has political
impact. See USCEA, supra note 210.
277. See Schwartz, ATOMIc AuDrr, supra note 11.
278. Eisenhower, supra note 2.

